Not enough yen to balance the budget by Fukuyama, Hirotaka
University of Mississippi
eGrove
Touche Ross Publications Deloitte Collection
1982
Not enough yen to balance the budget
Hirotaka Fukuyama
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_tr
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Deloitte Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touche Ross
Publications by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tempo, Vol. 28, no. 1 (1982), p. 54-56
Tax Reform in Japan 
Not Enough Yen 
to Balance 
the Budget / 
^ .c? J 
by HIROTAKA FUKUYAMA / International Tax Services 
Tohmatsu Awoki& Co., Tokyo 
L ike other industrialized and energy-dependent countries hit hard by the oil crisis in 1973, Japan has been struggling the last few years to balance its federal budget. In the fo l lowing article, Mr. Fukuyama 
traces his government's unsuccessful attempts to do so by means of funda-
mental changes in the Japanese tax laws. [Editor] 
In 1973, before the first oil crisis, Japan 
maintained an annual economic 
growth in real terms of approximately 
10 percent. As company profits and 
individual taxpayer income grew year 
by year during this high-growth period, 
so did tax revenue. This revenue was 
enough to finance almost all govern-
ment spending and avoid having to 
issue government bonds to finance any 
revenue shortage. During this period, 
the Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry proposed various tax incentives 
almost every year, and the Ministry of 
Finance usually gave favorable consid-
eration to these proposals, knowing 
that economic growth eventually 
resulted in an overall increase in tax 
revenue. 
When the effects of the first oil crisis 
began to be felt, the character of the 
Japanese economy began to change, as 
did the government's fiscal policy. In 
the last two quarters of fiscal 1974, 
Japan experienced a negative growth 
in GNP, the first since World War II. 
Between then and 1980, GNP rose once 
again but only to about half of what it 
had been before the oil crisis. After the 
second oil crisis hit in 1980, that growth 
further slowed to 2 or 3 percent. But to 
maintain even this level of growth, 
government spending had to sustain 
approximately an 18 percent annual 
increase, because the government had 
pushed up public works spending. 
With corporate earnings and wage 
earners' income deteriorating, tax 
revenue did not increase at the same 
rate as public spending. Therefore, to 
finance this growing spending, govern-
ment bonds had to be issued. The value 
of these bonds increased from 20 
percent of federal spending in 1974 to 
35 percent in 1978 and after. 
At the same time, the tax incentives 
incorporated in income tax laws had 
been squeezed to the maximum in 
spite of opposition by business circles. 
The corporate income tax rate, in-
cluding local income taxes, was about 
54 percent (56 percent after 1980), and 
the individual income tax rate structure 
had a very sharp progressive pattern: 57 
percent on incremental income over 
$40,000 (y10 million), 71 percent on 
income above $80,000, and 93 percent 
on income over $320,000, with an 
average ceiling of 80 percent on total 
income. 
In Japan, the ratio of income tax to all 
types of taxes, including local taxes, is 
70 to 74 percent, which is considerably 
higher than the ratio is in European 
countries. For example, in France it is 38 
percent, in Germany 50 percent, and 
in the U.K., 60 percent. Thus, it was 
decided that only non-income taxes 
would allow for increase. 
Taxable Alternatives 
With individual income tax rates so 
high, it was clear that there would be 
no room for a further increase, nor 
would the slow growth in corporate 
profit and individual income produce 
tax revenue sufficient to satisfy ever-
increasing government spending— 
especially on such controversial items 
as social insurance (medical expenses 
and pension), National Railroad assis-
tance, and agricultural subsidies. So 
instead, the government proposed a 5 
percent value-added tax (VAT), to take 
effect on April 1,1980. Its objective was 
to have more people share the tax 
burden. 
Because VAT would be passed on to 
consumers regardless of their income 
bracket, the government made every 
effort to get a consensus of opinion by 
as many groups as possible. One of its 
concerns was that VAT would be 
inflationary. Due to a lack of public 
support, however, the VAT law was 
never actually voted on in the Diet, 
Japan's legislature. Any new tax law is 
always unpopular with the public, and 
the government party did not want to 
lose votes in the 1979 general election. 
At about the same time as VAT was 
proposed, Japanese tax authorities 
suggested a system of taxpayer serial 
numbers to prevent tax evasion. Under 
the current tax law, a taxpayer can pay 
tax on interest and dividend income in 
one of two ways. He may pay a tentative 
20 percent withholding tax upon 
receipt of such income and then 
include such interest and dividends in 
his annual return, for which he pays 
progressive rates of income tax based 
on his aggregate annual income; or, he 
may pay a 35 percent withholding tax 
without being required to state his 
annual aggregation of interest, 
dividends, and all other income. 
Moreover, a tax exemption for interest 
income is permitted, with a ceiling of 
$12,000 (y 3 million) on the principal 
amount of savings producing interest in 
any of three groups of savings: postal 
savings, government bonds, and a 
third group, including bank deposits, 
corporate bonds, debentures, and loan 
trusts. 
Effective January 1,1984, however, the 
government has proposed to abolish 
the nonaggregated 35 percent 
withholding tax system and exercise 
more strictly the ceilings for interest 
exemption. As a current practice, 
financial institutions have no choice but 
to accept savings without any assurance 
from a depositor that the total sum of 
savings has reached the ceiling. The 
taxpayer serial number system is 
strenuously opposed by both voters 
and the political parties, mainly because 
of possible infringement of taxpayers' 
privacy. 
The Green Card System 
In place of the original taxpayer serial 
numbers system, the government has 
proposed an alternative—the Green 
Card System. Under this plan, if a 
taxpayer wants to have tax-free savings, 
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district tax office and then submit that 
card to his financial institution, which is 
required to confirm whether or not he 
has reached the interest exemption 
ceiling. The Green Card summarizes his 
interest-ceiling status. 
The government succeeded in 
passing the Green Card System legisla-
tion in March 1980, with a 45-month 
moratorium and an implementation 
date on or after January 1,1984. The 
reasons that the system has succeeded 
thus far are that only wealthy people 
will be affected, that the moratorium 
period is lengthy, and that "green"has a 
nice sound to it. 
As its implementation date nears, 
taxpayers have started to recognize the 
likely impact of the Green Card. Interest 
income on savings in excess of the 
ceilings ($36,000 of principal for all 
three types of savings) could be taxed 
at 93 percent, if annual income exceeds 
$320,000, and at 61 percent, if income is 
between $48,000 and $60,000. A savings 
principal of $36,000 is not an overly 
significant amount in Tokyo, however. 
For example, an apartment with 700 
square feet of floor space and located 
an hour's commuting distance from the 
heart of Tokyo costs about $200,000. 
To escape the Green Card System, 
some depositors are taking their savings 
and moving them to other investments. 
One indication of this is that postal 
savings have been slowing down. In 
March of last year, a record net 
withdrawal of $1.3 billion was regis-
tered. And the import of gold for the 
first half of 1981 was five times greater 
than it was a year earlier, when gold 
fever quickly broke with the sharp drop 
in gold prices. 
"Zero Coupon Bonds" 
Those not buying gold have been 
making a rush, particularly since the 
beginning of last year, to acquire 
so-called "zero coupon bonds"— 
original-issue discount bonds denomi-
nated in foreign currency—because they 
consider such bonds to be beyond the 
control of the Green Card System. In 
February alone, a massive $780 million 
worth of these bonds was purchased by 
Japanese investors. Under the current 
law, it is true that capital gains from 
sales of shares, bonds, and debentures 
are, in principle, tax free to the 
individual taxpayer. However, original-
issue discount bonds are taxable to the 
bond holders at the time they mature 
and are redeemed, although no 
withholding tax is imposed if the bonds 
are issued outside Japan. Thus, if a bond 
holder sells a zero coupon bond before 
its maturity date, no Japanese tax will 
be imposed on the gain from its sale. 
To prevent investors from circum-
venting the Green Card System, the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) formally 
notified all security companies in 
March to refrain for the time being 
from selling zero coupon bonds. The 
MOF feels that this will decrease the 
outflow of capital from Japan, which 
appears to be one of the leading factors 
for strengthening the yen. Tax author-
ities also have recommended that this 
year's revision in the tax law include a 
reporting requirement by securities 
companies to identify the purchasers of 
these bonds. Due to foreign exchange 
regulation, securities companies 
currently sell zero coupon bonds to a 
customer's account without actually 
delivering the bond certificates to that 
customer. With the imposition of the 
reporting requirement, bondholders 
might be wary about purchasing more 
bonds because the tax authorities could 
trace the source of cash. 
In the past few months, opposition to 
the introduction of the Green Card 
System has increased sharply, due to 
signs that tremendous shifts of money 
are about to trigger major disruptions of 
the money market. The ruling political 
party has proposed a three-year freeze 
of the law and has deferred its imple-
mentations from 1984 to 1987. 
One of the reasons for the Green 
Card freeze is that this system might 
have an adverse effect on Japan's ratio 
of savings to disposable income. 
Compared to that in western countries, 
this ratio has been extraordinarily high. 
It peaked at 24.3 percent in 1974 and 
declined to 20.6 percent in 1981. This 
may be compared with 4.3 percent in 
the U.S. and 9.5 percent in West 
Germany in 1979. 
The high rate of savings has made 
available vast amounts of funds for 
corporate investments in plants and 
equipment, which in turn supported 
the high economic growth in Japan 
before the first oil crisis. Since then, this 
savings has been a primary source of 
funds for purchasing government 
bonds. Without sufficient savings, the 
issuance of great numbers of govern-
ment bonds would have led to high 
inflation, as well as to the crowding out 
of corporate borrowers from the capital 
market. 
Conclusion 
For the last few years, the Japanese 
government has been unsuccessful in 
making a fundamental change in the tax 
laws. And while a powerful Members 
Committee has been organized to plan 
for a smaller government, people feel 
that such a plan would be difficult to 
implement. 
Without either an increase in tax 
revenue or a decrease in government 
spending, the government's revenue 
shortfall will have to be financed by the 
sale of bonds, the outstanding balance 
of which has reached almost 40 percent 
of Japan's GNR Assuming that the 
interest rate on these bonds is 8 percent 
per annum, the government's annual 
interest payments amount to 3.2 
percent of GNR But because the 
government budget is roughly 20 
percent of GNP, 16 percent of the 
government budget must be used for 
interest payments. 
People agree that there needs to be 
some fundamental change in Japanese 
fiscal policy, but they do not like to 
change their own lives. & 
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